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adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for 
carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses 
a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. 
The bads carried to the target cause a target loss while the blocked arcs cause a network 
loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from both target loss and network loss. The 
adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. In this model we study Nash equilibria and 
find a power law relation between the probability and the extent of the target loss. Our 
model contributes to the literature of game theory by introducing non-cooperative behavior 
into a Kalai-Zemel (cooperative) game of flow. Our research also advances models and 
results on network interdiction. 
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We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of ﬂow. An adversary,
endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a ﬂow specifying a plan for carrying bads through
a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for
blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target cause a target
loss while the blocked arcs cause a network loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from both
target loss and network loss. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. In this model we study
Nash equilibria and ﬁnd a power law relation between the probability and the extent of the target loss.
Our model contributes to the literature of game theory by introducing non-cooperative behavior into
a Kalai-Zemel (cooperative) game of ﬂow. Our research also advances models and results on network
interdiction.
JEL classiﬁcation: C72; D85; H56
Keywords: Network interdiction; Noncooperative game of ﬂow; Nash equilibrium; Power law; Kalai-
Zemel game of ﬂow
∗This paper is written under the supervision of Professor Myrna Wooders and has been presented at the Stony Brook Inter-
national Conference on Game Theory, July 2009, the Newport Beach Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory Conference,
May 2010, and the Second Brazilian Workshop of the Game Theory Society, August 2010. The author gratefully acknowledges
comments of the participants and also comments of Professors Andrew Daughety, Jennifer Reinganum, Jacob Sagi, and John
Weymark.1 Introduction
We live in a connected world. We produce and consume goods and services that have gone through networks.
Airlines, railroads, computer networks, and social networks are a few examples. However, those goods and
services are not always beneﬁcial to everyone. For example, ﬁrms may earn less proﬁts because the products
of their rival ﬁrms are brought to markets through supply chains. Revenue services may earn less tax revenue
because taxable assets are transferred through ﬁnancial networks and can be concealed in other countries.
Websites and network service providers may suﬀer from malicious software sent through the Internet. Coun-
tries and their citizens may suﬀer from hazardous materials carried through transportation systems. In these
contexts, competing products, concealed assets, malicious software, and hazardous materials are viewed as
bads, as opposed to goods, because they are harmful to some economic agents. The possibility of bads being
carried through networks motivates our model of network interdiction.
There are two players, say an adversary and an agency, interacting strategically in a given network. The
adversary is given a bounded quantity of bads at a base node and plans to carry bads to a target node. The
adversary chooses a ﬂow of bads that speciﬁes a plan for carrying bads through the network from the base
to the target. The agency is operating the network and wishes to stop the transport of bads to the target.
The agency chooses a blockage of arcs that speciﬁes a plan for stopping the transport of bads through the
network. The bads carried to the target cause a target loss while the blocked arcs cause a network loss.
The adversary earns and the agency loses from both target loss and network loss. The adversary incurs the
expense of carrying bads.
In this model we analyze the equilibrium behavior of the players. If the bounded quantity of bads is small,
there are pure strategy Nash equilibria. In these equilibria, the adversary carries bads up to the bounded
quantity in a dispersed way through the network, but the agency does not block any arcs. If the bounded
quantity of bads is either intermediate or large, there are mixed strategy Nash equilibria in which each player
chooses only two pure strategies with positive probability. In these equilibria, the adversary carries no bads
or carries a positive amount of bads to the target. Meanwhile, the agency blocks no arcs or blocks all the
arcs necessary to make the target unreachable through the network. From this analysis we learn which arcs
the agency blocks and how often she blocks them. We also learn how the adversary carries bads through the
network and how often he does.
In these Nash equilibria, the adversary successfully carries bads to the target if and only if the adversary
carries a positive amount of bads to the target and the agency does not block any arcs. By computing the
probability of this joint event, we calculate the equilibrium probability of the target loss. If the bounded
quantity of bads is either intermediate or large, there is a power law relation between the probability and
the extent of the target loss. This theoretical ﬁnding is consistent with empirical evidence.1
1In empirical research Bohorquez et al. [5] and Clauset et al. [6] show that the fatality distribution of terrorist events follows
a power law.
1This paper contributes to the game theory literature by introducing noncooperative behavior into a Kalai-
Zemel network ﬂow model. Kalai and Zemel [14] deﬁne a (transferable utility) cooperative game, called a
ﬂow game, where the worth of a coalition is deﬁned as the value of a maximum ﬂow in the network restricted
to the members of the coalition.2 Their main result is that a cooperative ﬂow game is totally balanced and
thus has a nonempty core (that is, there are distributions of the total payoﬀ of the game that are stable
against the formation of coalitions). The core of a ﬂow game depends on the structure of a network and the
ownership of arcs in the network. Our framework diﬀers in that players interact strategically. The agency
owns and operates all arcs in a network while the adversary abuses the network.
This paper also contributes to the literature on network interdiction. Washburn and Wood [18] introduce
a zero-sum game, where an evader chooses a path to move through a network and an interdictor chooses an arc
at which to set up an inspection site. If the evader traverses a path that includes the inspected arc, the evader
is detected with some exogenously given positive probability. Otherwise, the evader is not detected. Both
players are allowed to choose mixed strategies. Given a mixed strategy proﬁle, the interdiction probability
is deﬁned to be the average probability of the evader being detected. The evader aims to minimize the
interdiction probability by choosing a path-selection mixed strategy, while the interdictor aims to maximize
the interdiction probability by choosing an arc-inspection mixed strategy. By using linear programming and
network ﬂow techniques, Washburn and Wood [18] study the Nash equilibria of this game. Kodialam and
Lakshman [15] also introduce a related game of network interdiction in the context of network security.3
Our model diﬀers from the existing models on network interdiction in four aspects:
(i) The deﬁnition of a network is diﬀerent in that each arc has a capacity.
(ii) The adversary is endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, which may, in equilibrium, be binding.
(iii) Both players have larger sets of strategies. The adversary chooses a ﬂow rather than a path. If there
are multiple paths in a network, the adversary can use them all at once. The agency chooses a blockage
rather than an arc. That is, the agency can block multiple arcs at once.
(iv) Our network interdiction game is not a zero-sum game nor even a strictly competitive game.
Because of (i), we do not need to take the detection probability as given. In our model this probability is
determined endogenously. By virtue of (ii), we can analyze how the adversary’s resource constraint aﬀects
the adversary’s and the agency’s equilibrium behavior. By virtue of (iii), our model creates a more tractable
environment and gives sharper results on equilibrium behavior. Because of (iv), we need to use a diﬀerent
2For other studies on cooperative ﬂow games, see Kalai and Zemel [13], Granot and Granot [10], Potters et al. [16], and
Reijnierse et al. [17].
3Other than these papers, most of the literature on network interdiction deals with an interdictor’s optimization problem
subject to some budget constraints. See Cormican et al. [7], Israeli and Wood [11], and Wood [19].
2solution technique to ﬁnd equilibria. We exploit the idea that in any Nash equilibrium each player is
indiﬀerent between the pure strategies played with positive probability.
Security in network games has attracted signiﬁcant interest. For example, Ballester et al. [4] study the
interaction between players whose payoﬀs depend on a network. They obtain a proportional relationship
between how much eﬀort a player exerts and how central the player’s position is in the network. Baccara and
Bar-Isaac [2] study the formation of networks between criminals and terrorists and ﬁnd optimal policies for
law enforcement agencies. Baccara and Bar-Isaac [3] further study how the choice of interrogation methods
aﬀects the formation of terrorist networks. Goyal and Vigier [9] study the design and protection of networks
robust to attacks from outside on the networks’ nodes.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a game-theoretic model of network
interdiction. Section 3 studies the Nash equilibria of the model. Section 4 discusses our theoretical ﬁnding,
together with empirical evidence, and also discusses future research topics.
2 The Model
Two players, player 1 and player 2, strategically interact with each other in a given network. Players can be
thought of as ﬁrms in the context of market competition, as a taxpayer and a revenue service in the context
of tax evasion, as a malicious hacker and a network operator in the context of network security, or as a
terrorist group and a security agency in the context of national security. Having these security applications
in mind, we call player 1 an adversary and player 2 an agency.
2.1 Networks
We ﬁrst introduce the deﬁnition of networks. A network consists of a set of nodes, N, a set of arcs, A ⊂ N×N,
and a (row) vector of arc capacities, c := (cij)(i,j)∈A. Each arc is an ordered pair of distinct nodes and has a
positive capacity. For each i,j ∈ N with i 6= j, if (i,j) ∈ A, node i is connected to node j through arc (i,j)
with capacity cij > 0. Formally a network is deﬁned as a collection (N,A,c).
2.2 Strategies
We now introduce the set of strategies for each player.
Player 1, the adversary, is given a bound quantity q > 0 of bads at a node. This node is called base s.
Player 1 plans to carry bads to another node. This node is called target t. Player 1 chooses a ﬂow of bads
specifying a plan for carrying bads through network (N,A,c) from base s to target t.
4For a survey on other literature on networks, see Jackson [12].
3For each j ∈ N, we denote by IA(j) := {(i,j) : (i,j) ∈ A} the set of the arcs coming into node j and by
OA(j) := {(j,i) : (j,i) ∈ A} the set of the arcs going out from node j.
Formally a ﬂow of bads from base s to target t with bound quantity q in network (N,A,c) is a (column)
vector f := (fij)0
(i,j)∈A satisfying the following constraints:
0 ≤ fij ≤ cij for each (i,j) ∈ A, (1)
fis = 0 for each (i,s) ∈ IA(s), (2)
X
(s,i)∈OA(s)






fji = 0 for each j ∈ N \ {s,t}. (4)
Constraint (1) says that each arc ﬂow is at least zero and at most the arc capacity. Constraint (2) says that
each incoming ﬂow to the base is zero. Constraint (3) says that the total outgoing ﬂow from the base does
not exceed the bound quantity. Constraint (4) says that at each node, except for the base and the target,
the total incoming ﬂow equals to the total outgoing ﬂow. We denote by F(s,t,q,N,A,c) the set of all ﬂows
of bads from base s to target t with bound quantity q in network (N,A,c). When there is no ambiguity,
we write F instead of F(s,t,q,N,A,c). Then the set of pure strategies for player 1 is denoted by F. By
choosing a ﬂow f = (fij)0
(i,j)∈A ∈ F, player 1 carries fij amount of bads through arc (i,j).
The value of a ﬂow is deﬁned as the total incoming ﬂow to the target less the total outgoing ﬂow from the
target. Thus, the value of a ﬂow shows how much bads player 1 carries to the target. Let v := (vij)(i,j)∈A
be a (row) vector with vit = 1 for each (i,t) ∈ IA(t), vti = −1 for each (t,i) ∈ OA(t), and vij = 0 for each
(i,j) / ∈ IA(t) ∪ OA(t). Then the value of a ﬂow f ∈ F is calculated as







Constraints (1) through (4) imply that the value of a ﬂow is non-negative and constrained by the bound
quantity. That is, for each f ∈ F, we have
0 ≤ v · f ≤ q. (6)
We present examples of strategies for player 1. A ﬂow fo ∈ F is the zero ﬂow if fo is the vector of zeros.
A ﬂow fτ ∈ F is trivial if v · fτ = 0. Notice that the zero ﬂow fo is trivial. A ﬂow f∗ ∈ F is a maximum
ﬂow if for each f ∈ F, we have v ·f∗ ≥ v ·f. Notice that the value of a maximum ﬂow is constrained by the
bound quantity.
Player 2, the agency, wishes to stop the transport of bads to the target. Player 2 chooses a blockage of
arcs specifying a plan for stopping the transport of bads through network (N,A,c) to target t. Formally a
blockage of arcs in network (N,A,c) is a (column) vector b := (bij)0
(i,j)∈A with bij ∈ {0,1} for each (i,j) ∈ A.
We denote by B(N,A,c) the set of all blockages of arcs in network (N,A,c). When there is no ambiguity,
we write B instead of B(N,A,c). Then the set of pure strategies for player 2 is denoted by B. By choosing
4a blockage b = (bij)0
(i,j)∈A ∈ B, if bij = 1, player 2 blocks arc (i,j), and if bij = 0, player 2 does not block
the arc. For each b ∈ B, we denote by Ab := {(i,j) ∈ A : b = (bij)0
(i,j)∈A and bij = 1} the set of all blocked
arcs.
The capacity of a blockage is deﬁned as the total capacity of the blocked arcs. Thus, the capacity of
a blockage shows how much total arc capacity player 2 blocks in the network. The capacity of a blockage
b ∈ B is calculated as




A cut (C,C) in network (N,A,c) is a partition of the node set N with s ∈ C and t ∈ C. For each cut
(C,C), an arc (i,j) ∈ A is a cut arc if i ∈ C and j ∈ C. That is, through a cut arc (i,j), node i in C is
connected to node j in C. For each cut (C,C), we denote by A(C,C) := {(i,j) ∈ A : i ∈ C and j ∈ C} the
set of all cut arcs.
We present examples of strategies for player 2. A blockage bo ∈ B is the zero blockage if bo is the vector
of zeros. A blockage b ∈ B is a cut blockage if there is a cut (C,C) such that A(C,C) = Ab. A blockage
b∗ ∈ B is a minimum cut blockage if for each cut blockage b, we have c · b∗ ≤ c · b.
Players are allowed to choose mixed strategies. The set of mixed strategies for player 1 is denoted by
∆(F) and the set of mixed strategies for player 2 is denoted by ∆(B).
2.3 Net Flows
Here we want to know how much bads player 1 successfully carries to the target when player 1 chooses a
ﬂow of bads and player 2 chooses a blockage of arcs. To answer this question we introduce the deﬁnition of
net ﬂows. For each ﬂow of bads and each blockage of arcs, the net ﬂow of bads to the target is obtained by
(i) decomposing the ﬂow of bads into cycle ﬂows and path ﬂows and (ii) removing all the cycle ﬂows and
all the path ﬂows with blocked arcs. To introduce net ﬂows formally we need the following deﬁnitions and
notations.
An s − t path in network (N,A,c) is a sequence of distinct nodes i1,...,iK such that (ik,ik+1) ∈ A for
each k ∈ {1,...,K −1} with i1 = s and iK = t. In this case we say that the s−t path includes arcs (i1,i2),
..., (iK−1,iK). A cycle in network (N,A,c) is a sequence of distinct nodes i1,...,iK such that (ik,ik+1) ∈ A
for each k ∈ {1,...,K − 1} with (iK,i1) ∈ A. In this case we say that the cycle includes arcs (i1,i2), ...,
(iK−1,iK), and (iK,i1). We denote by H the set of all s − t paths and cycles in network (N,A,c).





1 if h ∈ H includes a ∈ A
0 otherwise.
A cycle ﬂow is a ﬂow of bads along a cycle. A path ﬂow is a ﬂow of bads along an s − t path. By the
ﬂow decomposition algorithm, which will be presented in Appendix A, we can decompose a ﬂow of bads into
5cycle ﬂows and path ﬂows.5 Formally, for each f ∈ F, we ﬁnd a (column) vector x := (xh)0
h∈H such that
f = Mx. That is, either along a cycle h ∈ H, or along an s − t path h ∈ H, player 1 carries xh amount of
bads.
For such vector x and each blockage b, let xb := (xb
h)0






xh if h is an s − t path including no blocked arcs
0 otherwise.
That is, only along an s − t path h ∈ H with no blocked arcs, player 1 successfully carries xb
h = xh amount
of bads to the target.
We are ready to deﬁne net ﬂows. For each f ∈ F and each b ∈ B, the net ﬂow of bads to target t under
ﬂow f and blockage b is a (column) vector fb := (fb
ij)0
(i,j)∈A such that Mxb = fb. Then the value of the net
ﬂow fb is calculated as v · fb, which shows how much bads player 1 successfully carries to the target.
Notice that the net ﬂow fb under a ﬂow f and a blockage b contains no cycle ﬂows. Furthermore, the
net ﬂow fb
o
under a ﬂow f and the zero blockage bo contains all path ﬂows but no cycle ﬂows. We say that
a ﬂow f ∈ F is acyclic if f = fb
o
. Also notice that the net ﬂow fb under a ﬂow f and a cut blockage b is
the zero ﬂow fo. That is, if b is a cut blockage, for each f ∈ F, we have fb = fo.
The following example shows how to ﬁnd net ﬂows.
Example 1 Suppose that a network is given as (N,A,c), where N = {s,i1,i2,t} is the set of nodes, A =
{(s,i1),(s,i2),(i1,i2),(i2,t),(t,i1)} is the set of arcs, and c = (csi1,csi2,ci1i2,ci2t,cti1) = (4,1,2,5,2) is
the vector of arc capacities. A bound quantity is given as q = 3. Suppose that player 1 chooses a ﬂow
f = (fsi1,fsi2,fi1i2,fi2t,fti1)0 = (1,1,2,3,1)0. See Figure 1. In network (N,A,c) there are two s − t paths























where the ﬁrst column corresponds to path s,i1,i2,t, the second column corresponds to path s,i2,t, and the
third column corresponds to cycle i1,i2,t,i1. By using the ﬂow decomposition algorithm, we ﬁnd a vector
x = (1,1,1)0 such that f = Mx. Each entry of the vector x shows the amount of bads player 1 carries
along path s,i1,i2,t, path s,i2,t, and cycle i1,i2,t,i1, respectively. Now suppose that player 2 chooses a
blockage b = (bsi1,bsi2,bi1i2,bi2t,bti1)0 = (0,1,0,0,0)0. Then path s,i1,i2,t is the only s − t path with no
blocked arcs. Thus, xb = (1,0,0)0. Therefore, the net ﬂow of bads to target t under ﬂow f and blockage b is
fb = Mxb = (1,0,1,1,0)0 and the value of this net ﬂow is v · fb = 1. 
5The ﬂow decomposition algorithm is developed by Ford and Fulkerson [8]. For a discussion see Ahuja et al. [1]. In our
model we use this algorithm to ﬁnd net ﬂows.
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Figure 1 Each solid circle indicates a node; each arrow indicates an arc; in each pair of numbers the ﬁrst
bold number indicates an arc ﬂow and the second light number indicates the arc capacity.
2.4 Payoﬀ Functions
We introduce the payoﬀ function of each player.
The bads carried to the target cause a target loss. This target loss is determined by the value of the net
ﬂow of bads, v ·fb, as well as by the marginal target loss, `t > 0. For each f ∈ F and each b ∈ B, the target
loss amounts to `t(v · fb). Player 1 earns `t(v · fb) and player 2 loses the same amount from the target loss.
The blocked arcs cause a network loss. This network loss is determined by the capacity of the blockage
of arcs, c · b, as well as by the marginal network loss, `k > 0. For each b ∈ B, the network loss amounts to
`k(c · b). Player 1 earns `k(c · b) and player 2 loses the same amount from the network loss.
Player 1 incurs the expense of carrying bads. This expense is determined by the value of the ﬂow of bads,
v · f, as well as by the marginal expense of carrying bads, e > 0. For each f ∈ F, the expense of carrying
bads amounts to e(v · f).
Player 2 earns a constant worth of operating the network, w.
For each (f,b) ∈ F × B, the payoﬀ function of player 1 is deﬁned as
u1(f,b) = `t(v · fb) + `k(c · b) − e(v · f),
and the payoﬀ function of player 2 is deﬁned as
u2(f,b) = w − `t(v · fb) − `k(c · b).
For each σ = (σ1,σ2) ∈ ∆(F) × ∆(B), the expected payoﬀ functions of the players are
u1(σ1,σ2) = Eσ[u1(f,b)] and u2(σ1,σ2) = Eσ[u2(f,b)].
Remark 1 Since expected payoﬀ functions are unique up to an aﬃne transformation, without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that the marginal network loss equals to one, that is, `k = 1.
73 Results
We analyze the equilibrium behavior of the players in the model. In a Nash equilibrium each player has no
incentive to change his or her strategy.
Deﬁnition 1 A strategy proﬁle (σ1,σ2) ∈ ∆(F) × ∆(B) is a Nash equilibrium if for each σ0
1 ∈ ∆(F) and
each σ0
2 ∈ ∆(B), we have u1(σ1,σ2) ≥ u1(σ0
1,σ2) and u2(σ1,σ2) ≥ u2(σ1,σ0
2).
We suppose that the marginal target loss is greater than the marginal expense of carrying bads.6 Then
the adversary has an incentive to carry bads through the network. Given this, we want to answer the
following questions: Does the agency have any incentive to block arcs in the network? Which arcs does the
agency have to block? And how often does the agency have to block the arcs? To answer these questions
we divide our analysis into three cases depending on the bound quantity. We say that the bound quantity q
is small if q ≤ (1/`t)c · b∗, intermediate if (1/`t)c · b∗ < q ≤ c · b∗, and large if c · b∗ < q.
For our analysis we need the following deﬁnitions and notations. We denote by fα an acyclic maximum




Because q is large,
v · fα = c · b∗. (9)
That is, the value of an acyclic maximum ﬂow equals to the capacity of a minimum cut blockage. This
equality is called the max-ﬂow min-cut theorem.7




In addition the max-ﬂow min-cut theorem (9) implies that
v · fβ = q. (11)
That is, the value of a binding ﬂow equals to the bound quantity.
We are ready to start our equilibrium analysis. First we suppose that the bound quantity is small.
We call (fβ,bo) a binding-ﬂow zero-blockage strategy proﬁle. In any binding-ﬂow zero-blockage strategy
proﬁle, if the bound quantity is small, each player has no incentive to change his or her strategy. Thus, we
have the following proposition.
6If the marginal target loss is no greater than the marginal expense of carrying bads, the adversary has no incentive to carry
bads through the network from the base to the target. Given this, the agency has no incentive to block arcs in the network.
Thus, any trivial-ﬂow zero-blockage strategy proﬁle (fτ,bo) is a Nash equilibrium.
7Ford and Fulkerson [8] introduce the maximum ﬂow problem in networks and show the max-ﬂow min-cut theorem. For a
detailed discussion see Ahuja et al. [1].
8Proposition 1 If the bound quantity is small, that is, if q ≤ (1/`t)c·b∗, then any binding-ﬂow zero-blockage
strategy proﬁle (fβ,bo) is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix B.
In any binding-ﬂow zero-blockage Nash equilibrium, player 1 carries bads up to the bound quantity in
a dispersed way through the network, but player 2 does not block any arcs in the network. We provide an
example of this equilibrium.
Example 2 Consider network (N,A,c) in Example 1. Notice that fα = (2,1,2,3,0)0 is the only acyclic
maximum ﬂow and b∗ = (0,1,1,0,0)0 is the only minimum cut blockage. Also notice that the capacity of
the minimum cut blockage is c · b∗ = 3. Suppose that the marginal target loss is `t = 2, the marginal
expense of carrying bads is e = 1, and the bound quantity is q = 1. Then the binding ﬂow is fβ =
(2/3,1/3,2/3,1,0)0. Because the bound quantity is small, the binding-ﬂow zero-blockage strategy proﬁle
(fβ,bo) is a Nash equilibrium. However, if player 1 carries bads up to the bound quantity only through arcs
(s,i2) and (i2,t), player 2 has the incentive to block arc (s,i2). 
If the bound quantity is small and player 1 carries bads in a dispersed way through the network, then
player 2 has no incentive to block arcs. However, if the bound quantity is not small, that is, if the bound
quantity is either intermediate or large, then player 2 has an incentive to block arcs in the network. Now
we want to know which arcs player 2 must block and how often she blocks them. Consider the following
example.
Example 3 Consider network (N,A,c) in Example 1. Suppose that player 2 chooses a cut blockage b =
(1,1,0,0,0)0, that is, suppose that player 2 blocks all the arcs from the base. Then player 2 incurs a network
loss of 5. However, if player 2 chooses the minimum cut blockage b∗ = (0,1,1,0,0)0, she incurs a network
loss of 3. Since both b and b∗ are cut blockages, for each ﬂow f, the net ﬂow is the zero ﬂow, that is, fb = fo
and fb
∗
= fo. Thus, the target loss is zero. Therefore, b is a dominated strategy for player 2. 
In general, if b is a cut blockage but not a minimum cut blockage and b∗ is a minimum cut blockage, then
b is dominated by b∗ for player 2, that is, for each f ∈ F, u2(f,b) < u2(f,b∗). Thus, it may be a dominated
strategy for player 2 to block all the arcs from the base or to block all the arcs into the target. If player 2
blocks arcs, she must block minimum cut arcs in the network.
Now imagine that player 2 blocks minimum cut arcs in the network with probability 1. Then player 1
has no incentive to carry bads through the network because he always fails to reach the target. If player 1
carries no bads to the target with probability 1, player 2 has no incentive to block the arcs. This is because
she wants to avoid the network loss if there is no threat to the target. In turn, if player 2 blocks no arcs with
probability 1, player 1 has an incentive to carry bads. If player 1 carries bads with probability 1, player 2
has an incentive to block arcs. In general, if the bound quantity is either intermediate or large, there is no
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
9To study how often to block minimum cut arcs, we examine the mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the
model. Now we suppose that the bound quantity is large.
A mixed strategy σλ
1 ∈ ∆(F) is a λ-scaled max-ﬂow strategy, or simply a λ-ﬂow strategy, for player 1 if for
some λ ∈ [1/`t,1], σλ
1(fτ) = 1−1/λ`t and σλ
1(λfα) = 1/λ`t. By choosing a λ-ﬂow strategy player 1 chooses
a trivial ﬂow fτ with probability 1−1/λ`t and a λ-scaled acyclic maximum ﬂow λfα with probability 1/λ`t.
For example, if λ = 1, player 1 carries no bads from the base to the target with probability 1 − 1/`t and
carries the maximum possible amount of bads through the network with probability 1/`t. Here λ is a scale
to adjust the probability and the amount of bads.
A mixed strategy σ∗
2 ∈ ∆(B) is a min-cut strategy for player 2 if σ∗
2(bo) = e/`t and σ∗
2(b∗) = 1 − e/`t.
By choosing a min-cut strategy player 2 chooses the zero blockage bo with probability e/`t and a minimum
cut blockage b∗ with probability 1 − e/`t. That is, player 2 blocks no arcs with probability e/`t and blocks
minimum cut arcs with probability 1 − e/`t.
We call (σλ
1,σ∗
2) a λ-ﬂow min-cut strategy proﬁle.
Notice that player 1 chooses only two pure strategies fτ and λfα with positive probability. Given that
player 2 chooses a min-cut strategy σ∗





= (1 − e/`t)(c · b∗),
because player 1 earns u1(fτ,bo) = 0 with probability σ∗
2(bo) = e/`t and earns u1(fτ,b∗) = c · b∗ with
probability σ∗
2(b∗) = 1 − e/`t. Given a min-cut strategy σ∗
2, by choosing a λ-scaled acyclic maximum ﬂow





= (1 − e/`t)(c · b∗), (12)
because player 1 earns u1(λfα,bo) = (`t−e)(v·λfα) with probability σ∗
2(bo) = e/`t and earns u1(λfα,b∗) =
c·b∗ −e(v·λfα) with probability σ∗
2(b∗) = 1−e/`t. Thus, u1(fτ,σ∗
2) = u1(λfα,σ∗
2). By choosing a min-cut
strategy σ∗
2, player 2 makes player 1 indiﬀerent between the two pure strategies fτ and λfα.
Now notice that player 2 chooses only two pure strategies bo and b∗ with positive probability. Given that
player 1 chooses a λ-ﬂow strategy σλ





= w − v · fα,
because player 2 earns u2(fτ,bo) = w with probability σλ
1(fτ) = 1−1/λ`t and u2(λfα,bo) = w−λ`t(v ·fα)
with probability σλ
1(λfα) = 1/λ`t. Given a λ-ﬂow strategy σλ
1, by choosing a minimum cut blockage b∗,
player 2 earns an expected payoﬀ of
u2(σλ
1,b∗) = w − c · b∗, (13)
10because player 2 earns w − c · b∗ whichever strategy player 1 chooses. Thus, the max-ﬂow min-cut theorem
(9) implies that u2(σλ
1,bo) = u2(σλ
1,b∗). By choosing a λ-ﬂow strategy σλ
1, player 1 makes player 2 indiﬀerent
between the two pure strategies bo and b∗.
In addition, we can show that for each player, these pure strategies are at least as good as any other
pure strategies. Thus, in any λ-ﬂow min-cut strategy proﬁle, each player has no incentive to change his or
her strategy. Therefore, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the bound quantity is large, that is, if c · b∗ < q, then any λ-ﬂow min-cut strategy proﬁle
(σλ
1,σ∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix B. We provide an example of λ-ﬂow min-cut Nash
equilibria.
Example 4 Consider network (N,A,c) in Example 1. Recall that fα = (2,1,2,3,0)0 is the acyclic maximum
ﬂow and b∗ = (0,1,1,0,0)0 is the minimum cut blockage. Suppose that `t = 4, e = 1, and q = 5. Because the
bound quantity is large, any λ-ﬂow min-cut strategy proﬁle (σλ
1,σ∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium. For instance, in a
λ-ﬂow min-cut Nash equilibrium with λ = 1, player 1 chooses the zero ﬂow fo with probability σλ
1(fo) = 3/4
and the acyclic maximum ﬂow fα with probability σλ
1(fα) = 1/4, and player 2 chooses the zero blockage bo
with probability σ∗
2(bo) = 1/4 and the minimum cut blockage b∗ with probability σ∗
2(b∗) = 3/4. See Figure 2.

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Figure 2 The bold numbers indicate the acyclic maximum ﬂow; the line segments indicate the minimum
cut blockage.
In any λ-ﬂow min-cut Nash equilibrium there is a power law relation between the probability and the
extent of the target loss. In this equilibrium, player 1 successfully carries bads to the target if and only
if player 1 chooses a λ-scaled acyclic maximum ﬂow λfα and player 2 chooses the zero blockage bo. This
joint event takes place with probability (1/λ`t)(e/`t) = (1/λ)(e)`
−2
t . Thus, with this probability, the bads
carried to the target cause the target loss. Therefore, in any λ-ﬂow min-cut Nash equilibrium, the target
loss probability is pλ = (1/λ)(e)`
−2
t .
11In any λ-ﬂow min-cut Nash equilibrium, if player 1 successfully carries bads to the target, the target loss
amounts to TLλ = (λ`t)(c · b∗). Because pλ = (1/λ)(e)`
−2
t and `t = (1/λ)(1/(c · b∗))TLλ, we have
pλ = (λ)(e)(c · b∗)2(TLλ)−2 (14)
where λ ∈ (1/`t,1]. Furthermore, if λ = (`t)−θ for some θ ∈ [0,1), equality (14) can be rewritten as









θ−1 . Thus, in any λ-ﬂow min-cut Nash equilibrium with
λ = (`t)−θ for some θ ∈ [0,1), the target loss probability pλ is a negative power function of the target loss
TLλ. However, if λ = 1/`t, we have pλ = (e)`
−1
t and TLλ = c · b∗. Thus, if λ = 1/`t, the equilibrium
probability pλ is independent of the target loss TLλ.
Finally we suppose that the bound quantity is intermediate.
A mixed strategy σ
µ
1 ∈ ∆(F) is a µ-scaled binding-ﬂow strategy, or simply a µ-ﬂow strategy, for player 1
if for some µ ∈ [(1/`t)(1/q)(c · b∗),1], σ
µ
1(fτ) = 1 − (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗) and σ
µ
1(µfβ) = (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗).
By choosing a µ-ﬂow strategy player 1 chooses a trivial ﬂow fτ with probability 1−(1/µ`t)(1/q)(c·b∗) and
a µ-scaled binding ﬂow µfβ with probability (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗). For example, if µ = 1, player 1 carries no
bads from the base to the target with probability 1 − (1/`t)(1/q)(c · b∗) and carries bads up to the bound





2) a µ-ﬂow min-cut strategy proﬁle.
Notice that player 1 chooses only two pure strategies fτ and µfβ with positive probability. Given a min-
cut strategy σ∗
2, by choosing a trivial ﬂow fτ, player 1 earns an expected payoﬀ of u1(fτ,σ∗
2) = (1−e/`t)(c·b∗).
Given a min-cut strategy σ∗





= (1 − e/`t)(c · b∗), (16)
because player 1 earns u1(µfβ,bo) = (`t−e)(v·µfβ) with probability σ∗
2(bo) = e/`t and earns u1(µfβ,b∗) =
c·b∗ −e(v ·µfβ) with probability σ∗
2(b∗) = 1−e/`t. Thus, u1(fτ,σ∗
2) = u1(µfβ,σ∗
2). By choosing a min-cut
strategy σ∗
2, player 2 makes player 1 indiﬀerent between the two pure strategies fτ and µfβ.
Now notice that player 2 chooses only two pure strategies bo and b∗ with positive probability. Given a
µ-ﬂow strategy σ
µ








= w − c · b∗,
because player 2 earns u2(fτ,bo) = w with probability σ
µ
1(fτ) = 1−(1/µ`t)(1/q)(c·b∗) and earns u2(µfβ,bo) =
w −(µ`t)q with probability σ
µ
1(µfβ) = (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c·b∗). Given a µ-ﬂow strategy σ
µ
1, by choosing a mini-
12mum cut blockage b∗, player 2 earns an expected payoﬀ of
u2(σ
µ
1,b∗) = w − c · b∗, (17)





choosing a µ-ﬂow strategy σ
µ
1, player 1 makes player 2 indiﬀerent between the two pure strategies bo and b∗.
In addition, we can show that for each player, these pure strategies are at least as good as any other
pure strategies. Thus, in any µ-ﬂow min-cut strategy proﬁle, each player has no incentive to change his or
her strategy. Therefore, we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If the bound quantity is intermediate, that is, if (1/`t)c · b∗ < q ≤ c · b∗, then any µ-ﬂow
min-cut strategy proﬁle (σ
µ
1,σ∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 3 is presented in Appendix B. We provide an example of µ-ﬂow min-cut Nash
equilibria.
Example 5 Consider network (N,A,c) in Example 1. Suppose that `t = 4, e = 1, and q = 3/2. Notice
that the binding ﬂow is fβ = (1,1/2,1,3/2,0)0. Because the bound quantity is intermediate, any µ-ﬂow
min-cut strategy proﬁle (σ
µ
1,σ∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium. For instance, in a µ-ﬂow min-cut Nash equilibrium
with µ = 1, player 1 chooses the zero ﬂow fo with probability σ
µ
1(fo) = 1/2 and the binding ﬂow fβ with
probability σ
µ
1(fβ) = 1/2, and player 2 chooses the zero blockage bo with probability σ∗
2(bo) = 1/4 and the
minimum cut blockage b∗ with probability σ∗
2(b∗) = 3/4. See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 The bold numbers indicate the binding ﬂow; the line segments indicate the minimum cut blockage.
In any µ-ﬂow min-cut Nash equilibrium the probability and the extent of the target loss show a power
law relation. In this equilibrium, player 1 successfully carries bads to the target if and only if player 1
chooses a µ-scaled binding ﬂow µfβ and player 2 chooses the zero blockage bo. This joint event takes place
with probability (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗)(e/`t) = (1/µ)(1/q)(c · b∗)(e)`
−2
t . Thus, in any µ-ﬂow min-cut Nash
equilibrium, the target loss probability is pµ = (1/µ)(1/q)(c · b∗)(e)`
−2
t .
13In any µ-ﬂow min-cut Nash equilibrium, if player 1 successfully carries bads to the target, the target loss
amounts to TLµ = (µ`t)q. Because pµ = (1/µ)(1/q)(c · b∗)(e)`
−2
t and `t = (1/µ)(1/q)TLµ, we have
pµ = (µ)(e)(q)(c · b∗)(TLµ)−2 (18)
where µ ∈ ((1/`t)(1/q)(c · b∗),1]. Furthermore, if µ = (q)−θ(c · b∗)θ(`t)−θ for some θ ∈ [0,1), equality (18)
can be rewritten as









θ−1 . Thus, in any µ-ﬂow min-
cut Nash equilibrium with µ = (q)−θ(c · b∗)θ(`t)−θ for some θ ∈ [0,1), the target loss probability pµ is a
negative power function of the target loss TLµ. However, if µ = (1/`t)(1/q)(c·b∗), we have pµ = (e)`
−1
t and
TLµ = c·b∗. Thus, if µ = (1/`t)(1/q)(c·b∗), the equilibrium probability pµ is independent of the target loss
TLµ.
4 Discussion
We ﬁrst relate our results to some empirical studies of terrorist events and then discuss related research in
progress and further directions.
4.1 Fatality Distribution of Terrorist Events
Let z denote the number of fatalities in a terrorist event and let p(z) denote the frequency of a terrorist
event in which the number of fatalities is z. The fatality distribution of terrorist events follows a power law
if for each z ≥ zmin,
p(z) ∝ z−γ
where zmin and γ are the parameters of the distribution. The estimates of the parameters are derived from
data and denoted by ˆ zmin and ˆ γ.
Recent empirical studies show that the fatality distribution of terrorist events follows a power law.
Clauset et al. [6] use the database of National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)
and conclude that the fatality distribution follows a power law. The estimate of the scaling parameter is
ˆ γ = 2.38. Bohorquez et al. [5] construct a data set on insurgent wars and conclude that for each insurgent
war the fatality distribution follows a power law. The estimates of the scaling parameter are clustered around
2.5.
Recall that in any λ-ﬂow min-cut Nash equilibrium with λ = (`t)−θ for some θ ∈ [0,1), the target loss
probability pλ is a negative power function of the target loss TLλ. Precisely, from equality (15), we have









To link this theoretical ﬁnding and empirical evidence we make two additional assumptions. Suppose that
the target loss is measured by the number of fatalities and that the target loss probability is proportional to
the frequency of a terrorist event.
Now suppose that the estimate of the scaling parameter, ˆ γ ≥ 2, is derived from data. By setting ˆ γ =
ˆ θ−2
ˆ θ−1
and solving for ˆ θ, we have ˆ θ =
ˆ γ−2
ˆ γ−1. Notice that ˆ θ ∈ [0,1). Therefore, in the λ-ﬂow min-cut Nash equilibrium
with λ = (`t)−ˆ θ, the fatality distribution is predicted to be
pλ(TLλ) ∝ (TLλ)−ˆ γ
and is consistent with data. Similarly, in the µ-ﬂow min-cut Nash equilibrium with µ = (q)−ˆ θ(c·b∗)
ˆ θ(`t)−ˆ θ,
the predicted fatality distribution, pµ(TLµ) ∝ (TLµ)−ˆ γ, is consistent with data.
4.2 Further Research
This paper presents a strategic model of network interdiction where two players have complete information
and simultaneously choose their strategies. Building on this research we can study a model with incomplete
information where players may not know each other’s type. For example, a security agency may not know
the strategies and payoﬀs of an adversary. This extension to incomplete information is, in our view, of clear
importance. We can also study a model where players sequentially choose their strategies. For example, a
security agency may observe an adversary’s plots and choose her own strategy conditional on this observation
or, alternatively, the agency may move ﬁrst in setting up a security system. Both these approaches are
subjects of our current and future planned research.
15Appendix A
In this appendix we provide the ﬂow decomposition algorithm.8 A network is given as (N,A,c). For each
f ∈ F, we ﬁnd a vector x = (xh)0
h∈H such that f = Mx. Initially we are given a ﬂow f and the zero vector
x. At each step we construct a sequence of distinct nodes, and obtain either an s − t path or a cycle. We
then modify vector x and ﬂow f. This algorithm terminates when the modiﬁed ﬂow is the zero ﬂow.
Algorithm 1 Flow Decomposition
Let f = (fij)0
(i,j)∈A ∈ F be given. Let x = (xh)0
h∈H be the vector of zeros.
At Step k = 1,2, ..., if f is the zero ﬂow, this algorithm terminates and yields vector x. If f is not the
zero ﬂow, there is an arc (i,j) ∈ A with fij > 0.
(i) We start from base s. If there is (i1,i2) ∈ A with i1 = s and fi1i2 > 0, we begin the construction of a
sequence of distinct nodes with the two nodes i1 and i2. If there is (i2,i3) ∈ A with fi2i3 > 0, we add node i3
to the sequence. Repeat this until we add target t or a previously added node to the sequence. In the former
case, an s−t path is obtained and, in the latter case, a cycle is obtained. We denote the outcome by h ∈ H.
We replace xh = 0 with the minimum ﬂow of the arcs included in h. We then replace fij with fij − xh if h
includes (i,j). We proceed to the next step.
(ii) If there is no (i1,i2) ∈ A with i1 = s and fi1i2 > 0, we ﬁnd another arc (i,j) with fij > 0. We start
from node i. By applying the argument in (i), we obtain a cycle and modify vector x and ﬂow f. We proceed
to the next step. 
Appendix B
We ﬁrst establish the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 For each (f,b) ∈ F × B, we have v · fb
o
− v · fb ≤ c · b.
Proof. Let f ∈ F be any ﬂow. Because fb
o
is the net ﬂow of bads to the target under ﬂow f and the zero
blockage bo, for each (i,j) ∈ A, we have fb
o
ij ≤ cij. Thus, blocking arc (i,j) decreases the value of the net
ﬂow by at most cij. Therefore, for each b = (bij)0
(i,j)∈A ∈ B, we have v · fb
o
− v · fb ≤
P
(i,j)∈A cijbij. 
Lemma 2 If fα is an acyclic maximum ﬂow with large bound quantity q in network (N,A,c), for each
b ∈ B, we have v · fα − v · (fα)b ≤ c · b. Furthermore, if q ≤ (1/`t)c · b∗ and fβ is a binding ﬂow, for each
b ∈ B, we have `t(v · fβ) − `t(v · (fβ)b) ≤ c · b.
8See Ahuja et al. [1] and Ford and Fulkerson [8] for reference.
16Proof. Lemma 1 implies that for each b ∈ B, v · (fα)b
o
− v · (fα)b ≤ c · b. Because fα = (fα)b
o
from
equality (8), we have v · fα − v · (fα)b ≤ c · b. Now multiplying both sides by (`t)(q/(c · b∗)), we have
(`t)(q/(c·b∗))(v ·fα −v ·(fα)b) ≤ (`t)(q/(c·b∗))(c·b). Because fβ is a binding ﬂow and fβ = (q/(c·b∗))fα,
we have (`t)(q/(c · b∗))(v · fα − v · (fα)b) = `t(v · fβ) − `t(v · (fβ)b). Because q ≤ (1/`t)c · b∗, we have
(`t)(q/(c · b∗))(c · b) ≤ c · b. Thus, for each b ∈ B, we have `t(v · fβ) − `t(v · (fβ)b) ≤ c · b. 
We now present the proofs of the propositions.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that q ≤ (1/`t)c · b∗. We show that in any binding-ﬂow zero-blockage
strategy proﬁle (fβ,bo) each player has no incentive to change his or her strategy. Since (fβ)b
o
= fβ from
equality (10) and v·fβ = q from equality (11), we have u1(fβ,bo) = (`t−e)q. Suppose that player 1 chooses
any ﬂow f. Since v · fb
o
≤ v · f and v · f ≤ q,
u1(f,bo) = `t(v · fb
o
) + c · bo − e(v · f)
≤ `t(v · f) − e(v · f)
≤ (`t − e)q.
Thus, player 1 has no incentive to change his strategy. Since (fβ)b
o
= fβ from equality (10) and v · fβ = q
from equality (11), we have u2(fβ,bo) = w − (`t)q. Suppose that player 2 chooses any blockage b. Since
`t(v · fβ) − `t(v · (fβ)b) ≤ c · b from Lemma 2 and v · fβ = q from equality (11),
u2(fβ,b) = w − `t(v · (fβ)b) − c · b
≤ w − `t(v · fβ)
= w − (`t)q.
Thus, player 2 has no incentive to change her strategy. Therefore, (fβ,bo) is a Nash equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that c · b∗ < q. In any λ-ﬂow min-cut strategy proﬁle (σλ
1,σ∗
2) player 1
chooses only two pure strategies fτ and λfα with positive probability and player 2 chooses only two pure
strategies bo and b∗ with positive probability. In addition each player is indiﬀerent between the two pure
strategies played with positive probability. Thus, to show that (σλ
1,σ∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium, it suﬃces to
show that (i) for each f ∈ F, u1(λfα,σ∗
2) ≥ u1(f,σ∗
2) and (ii) for each b ∈ B, u2(σλ
1,b∗) ≥ u2(σλ
1,b).
(i) We show that for each f ∈ F, u1(λfα,σ∗
2) ≥ u1(f,σ∗
2). Let f ∈ F be any ﬂow. Calculate player 1’s
payoﬀs. Since v · fb
o
≤ v · f,
u1(f,bo) = `t(v · fb
o
) + c · bo − e(v · f)
≤ (`t − e)(v · f).
17Since v · fb
∗
= 0,
u1(f,b∗) = `t(v · fb
∗
) + c · b∗ − e(v · f)
= c · b∗ − e(v · f).
Since σ∗
2(bo) = e/`t and σ∗





≤ (e/`t)(`t − e)(v · f) + (1 − e/`t)(c · b∗ − e(v · f))
= (1 − e/`t)(c · b∗).
From (12) we know that u1(λfα,σ∗
2) = (1 − e/`t)(c · b∗). Thus, for each f ∈ F, u1(λfα,σ∗
2) ≥ u1(f,σ∗
2).
(ii) We show that for each b ∈ B, u2(σλ
1,b∗) ≥ u2(σλ
1,b). Let b ∈ B be any blockage. Calculate player
2’s payoﬀs. Since v · (fτ)b = 0,
u2(fτ,b) = w − `t(v · (fτ)b) − c · b
= w − c · b.
Since v · (λfα)b = λ(v · (fα)b),
u2(λfα,b) = w − `t(v · (λfα)b) − c · b
= w − λ`t(v · (fα)b) − c · b.
Since σλ
1(fτ) = 1 − 1/λ`t, σλ





= (1 − 1/λ`t)(w − c · b) + (1/λ`t)(w − λ`t(v · (fα)b) − c · b)
= w − c · b − v · (fα)b
≤ w − v · fα.
Then the max-ﬂow min-cut theorem (9) implies that u2(σλ
1,b) ≤ w − c · b∗. From (13) we know that
u2(σλ





2) is a Nash equilibrium. 




player 1 chooses only two pure strategies fτ and µfβ with positive probability and player 2 chooses only two
pure strategies bo and b∗ with positive probability. In addition each player is indiﬀerent between the two
pure strategies played with positive probability. Thus, to show that (σ
µ
1,σ∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium, it suﬃces
to show that (i) for each f ∈ F, u1(µfβ,σ∗
2) ≥ u1(f,σ∗





18(i) We show that for each f ∈ F, u1(µfβ,σ∗
2) ≥ u1(f,σ∗
2). Let f ∈ F be any ﬂow. Calculate player 1’s
payoﬀs. Since v · fb
o
≤ v · f,
u1(f,bo) = `t(v · fb
o
) + c · bo − e(v · f)
≤ (`t − e)(v · f).
Since v · fb
∗
= 0,
u1(f,b∗) = `t(v · fb
∗
) + c · b∗ − e(v · f)
= c · b∗ − e(v · f).
Since σ∗
2(bo) = e/`t and σ∗





≤ (e/`t)(`t − e)(v · f) + (1 − e/`t)(c · b∗ − e(v · f))
= (1 − e/`t)(c · b∗).
From (16) we know that u1(µfβ,σ∗
2) = (1 − e/`t)(c · b∗). Thus, for each f ∈ F, u1(µfβ,σ∗
2) ≥ u1(f,σ∗
2).




1,b). Let b ∈ B be any blockage. Calculate player
2’s payoﬀs. Since v · (fτ)b = 0,
u2(fτ,b) = w − `t(v · (fτ)b) − c · b
= w − c · b.
Since v · (µfβ)b = µ(v · (fβ)b),
u2(µfβ,b) = w − `t(v · (µfβ)b) − c · b
= w − µ`t(v · (fβ)b) − c · b.
Since σ
µ
1(fτ) = 1−(1/µ`t)(1/q)(c·b∗), σ
µ








= (1 − (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗))(w − c · b) + (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗)(w − µ`t(v · (fβ)b) − c · b)
= w − c · b − (1/q)(c · b∗)(v · (fβ)b)
= w − c · b − (1/q)(c · b∗)(q/(c · b∗))(v · (fα)b)
= w − c · b − v · (fα)b
≤ w − v · fα.
The last inequality comes from Lemma 2. Then the max-ﬂow min-cut theorem (9) implies that u2(σ
µ
1,b) ≤
w − c · b∗. From (17) we know that u2(σ
µ








2) is a Nash equilibrium. 
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